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Abstract

The Eurozone official sector has declared that the belated
restructuring of Greek bonds held by private sector creditors in 2012 was a
“unique and exceptional” event, never, ever to be repeated in any other
Eurozone country. Maybe so. But if this assurance proves in time to be as
fragile as the official sector’s prior pronouncements on the subject of “private
sector involvement” in Eurozone sovereign debt problems, any future
Eurozone debt restructuring will be surely plagued by the problem of nonparticipating creditors --- holdouts. Indeed, it is the undisguised fear of
holdouts and the prospect of a messy, Argentine-style debt restructuring in
the belly of Europe that has been one of the principal motivations for the
official sector’s willingness to use its taxpayer money to repay, in full and on
time, all of the private sector creditors of Eurozone countries receiving
bailouts (the belated Greek restructuring being the sole exception).
This article argues that a simple amendment of the Treaty
Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (the Eurozone’s new bailout
facility) could immunize within the confines of the Eurozone the assets of a
Eurozone country receiving ESM bailout assistance from attachment by
litigious holdout creditors. By thus increasing the difficulties that holdouts
would face in enforcing court judgments against a debtor country, the
objective of the amendment is to deflate creditor expectations that staying
out of an ESM-supported sovereign debt restructuring will lead to a
preferential recovery for the holdouts.
This measure would also, when taken together with the other
steps that the Eurozone has already implemented, substantially replicate the
important features of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism proposed
by the IMF in 2002.
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The architects of every Eurozone sovereign bailout program
(Cyprus is the one in the oven at the moment) must make a crucial threshold
decision: what to do with the sovereign’s debt maturing during the program
period. Mercifully, there are only two options -- pay it or restructure it.
The “pay it” alternative
Paying maturing debt requires the country to borrow the funds
from some source. Again, there are only two options: borrow from the
market to refinance maturities during the program period or borrow from
official sector bailout facilities like the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).
By definition, a country that enjoys market access at tolerably
low interest rates would not now be negotiating an official sector bailout
package, so genuine market refinancing is foreclosed. One possible solution
is to arrange for an official sector actor (the European Central Bank
volunteered for this role last September) to soften up the beaches by
purchasing the debtor country’s bonds in the secondary market in order to
depress the yields on those instruments. This, the theory goes, will allow the
country to issue new bonds in the primary market at coupon levels that
benefit from official sector intervention. If necessary, the ESM could also
purchase some of those new bonds when they are issued in the primary
market. The combination of ECB/ESM intervention would thus operate as an
official sector bailout masquerading as a normal market borrowing.

Paper prepared for presentation at the European University of Cyprus (Nicosia), January 30,
2013. The authors are, respectively, at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, LLP; Duke Law
School; Universidad Autonoma de Madrid. For background information on Cyprus, thanks to
Alexander Apostolides and Fiona Mullen.

2
[NEWYORK 2679889_1]

The “restructure it” alternative
The obvious question in these affairs is why ever would the
official sector entertain the idea of using taxpayer funds to pay out, in full and
on time, a debtor country’s existing creditors? One might have thought that
the official sector’s fiduciary duty to its taxpayers would require the architects
of these programs to reduce or defer, to the fullest extent possible, the
liabilities that will need to be covered by official sector lending. Indeed it is
precisely this sense of a fiduciary duty to their own taxpayers that
presumably justifies the official sector’s insistence that the recipient country
pare its budget deficit to the bare minimum by embracing fiscal austerity, and
maximize the country’s own contribution through privatization programs,
before official sector monies are used to cover the residual shortfall.
But this sense of fiduciary duty has thus far (with one
exception) stopped short of asking, or demanding, or for that matter even
permitting the recipient countries to reschedule their existing debts in order to
remove those liabilities from the list of items that must be paid using official
sector bailout funds.1 The bailout programs for Greece (until the official
sector reversed course and permitted a restructuring of private sector debt in
early 2012), Ireland and Portugal have each treated maturing debt as an
inviolable component of the recipient country’s balance sheet, one that
cannot and should not be subjected to any measures that would mitigate the
gross amount of official sector funding that must be poured into the recipient
country. The single exception to this rule was the belated, but successful,
Greek debt restructuring in the spring of 2012; an event that the official
sector continues to describe as “unique and exceptional” and never to be
repeated in another Eurozone country. If you believe that assurance, you
may stop reading this article now.2
The justifications
Why? If official sector negotiators have learned to steel their
hearts against the pleas of the old age pensioners, the unemployed, the
homeless, the sick, the blind and the lame in bailout recipient countries, why
should they show such solicitude for the country’s creditors? Why, to put the
1

The philosophy behind this policy was expressed by a former member of the Executive
Board of the ECB in these terms: “The only way to protect taxpayers in ‘virtuous’ countries
is to avoid over-indebted countries from easily getting away with not paying their debts; the
payment of debts should be enforced, through sanctions if need be.” Lorenzo Bini Smaghi,
“Private Sector Involvement: From (good) Theory to (bad) Practice (Berlin, June 6, 2011)
(available at http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2011/html/sp110606.en.html).
2

Of course, if the Eurozone members really believed this assurance, there would have been
no need for them to mandate the inclusion of an aggregated collective action clause in every
Eurozone sovereign bond issued after January 1, 2013. Those clauses serve only one
function -- to facilitate a future restructuring or amendment of the affected debt stocks.
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question in a lurid way, should the official sector insist that cancer patients in
the recipient country forego their medicine in the interests of salutary “fiscal
adjustment” but simultaneously recoil at visiting some discomfort on a hedge
fund manager in Greenwich, Connecticut who holds the country’s debt
obligations?
The predictable answer from the official sector negotiators will
be, “it’s complicated.” Here, insofar as we have been given the light to see
them, are the complications:
National pride. “Europeans pay their debts”, is how former
President Nicolas Sarkozy phrased it; a statement that showed a remarkably
shallow grasp of European history.3 Volumes have been written about the
serial debt default records of many European countries. But the spirit of
President Sarkozy’s statement shines through. A sovereign debt
restructuring, he believed, would be tantamount to an admission of emerging
market status. It would be inconsistent with the dignity, with the gloire, of a
modern European nation.
Contagion. With the entire periphery of Europe in the line of
fire, might not a debt restructuring in any one of them ignite a conflagration
that would soon engulf them all? If you had to restructure the debts of all of
them, that would surely destabilize the global banking industry. And from
there it is a short path to planetary ruin. This, more or less, is how the
contagion argument is typically formulated.
Incestuous relationships. Were all of these debts owed
exclusively to Greenwich, Connecticut-based hedge funds, the official sector
negotiators might say, then restructuring those liabilities would be permitted,
nay gleefully permitted. But they are not. A substantial part of the paper is
likely to be held by financial institutions in the sovereign’s own country -banks, insurance companies and pension funds. Restructuring those
instruments will therefore undermine the health of the domestic financial
system. Every euro saved in debt service might need to be spent in bank
recapitalizations. Moreover, much of the balance of the paper will be in the
hands of banks in northern European countries, the very countries that will
be making the largest contributions to the bailout funding. To this extent,
what appears to be a generous sovereign bailout of an overextended
neighbor is in reality a disguised recapitalization of the banking sectors in the
major contributing countries. (The lesson? All future Eurozone sovereign
bond issuances should be placed exclusively with investors domiciled in the
township of Greenwich, Connecticut, and secondary market transfers of
those instruments should be confined to the geographical boundaries of that
township.)
3

The full statement was “We will show that Europeans pay their debts.” Upfront, at p. 1,
International Financing Review (Dec. 10, 2011)
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Feasibility. Finally, there is the matter of the technical
feasibility of a debt restructuring in these circumstances. The bane of
sovereign debt restructurers over the last 30 years has been the problem of
holdout (non-participating) creditors. Creditors left behind in a sovereign
debt restructuring cause these problems:


If there are enough of them, the financial predicates
underlying the entire restructuring may be undone.



If holdouts are subsequently paid in full, it makes the
participating creditors look silly and this leads, in the next
restructuring, to even more holdouts.



If holdouts are not paid after the restructuring closes, they
pose an on-going litigation and attachment threat to the
sovereign debtor; witness Argentina’s decade-long legal fight
with thousands of holders of the Argentine bonds that went
into default in 2001.

Various techniques have been deployed in an effort to cajole,
seduce, bludgeon or rope recalcitrant creditors into the restructuring process,
none of them wholly successful. Holdouts were not a lethal threat in the
Greek debt restructuring of 2012 for only one reason: 93% of Greek bonds
were governed by local (Greek) law. This permitted the Greek Parliament to
retrofit a collective action mechanism on the local law debt stock that
operated to sweep potential holdouts into the deal. Greece did have a small
holdout population in this restructuring (equal to about 3% of the total eligible
debt), but these holdouts were concentrated in the country’s foreign lawgoverned bonds. Not every Eurozone country, however, enjoys this local law
advantage. Local law-governed bonds represent a minority of the overall
debt stocks in some of the smaller Eurozone countries and in the borrowings
by many sub-sovereign entities such as provinces and municipalities. In
addition, many Eurozone sovereigns will have some portion of their debt
stock in the form of foreign law-governed bonds; the most fertile ground for
the sprouting of holdout seedlings.
The threat of a significant holdout creditor population will
therefore haunt the debt restructuring of almost any Eurozone country. The
conventional method of minimizing such holdouts -- threatening to consign all
those who refuse the restructuring offer to the outer darkness of permanent
default -- is unlikely to be effective in this situation. Local holders of such
bonds may possibly be persuaded by the government to roll their positions.
But foreign holders can literally smell the official sector’s fear of a messy
sovereign debt workout in Europe. No one is eager to bring Argentina to the
belly of Europe. If the market had any lingering doubts about the matter, a
surfeit of official sector statements over the last three years have painted
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such an event as a catastrophe rivaling the Pleistocene ice age.4 In short,
some creditors will surely call the bluff of a threatened permanent sovereign
default in the Eurozone.
What can be done?
As shown by the Greek debt restructuring of 2012, with a bit of
ingenuity and courage the other concerns about a Eurozone sovereign debt
restructuring -- national pride, risk of contagion and incestuous
sovereign/banking sector linkages -- can be satisfactorily addressed.
Holdouts, however, will be a ubiquitous problem.
The choice of a foreign law to govern a sovereign debt
instrument will place it beyond the reach of the debtor’s own legislature. The
holder will therefore in all likelihood be able to reduce the claim to a foreign
court judgment, sometimes within a matter of months. With that judgment in
hand, the creditor can then begin to exert pressure on the sovereign
borrower by attempting to attach the sovereign’s off-shore assets (other than
those, like embassies, that enjoy a special immunity), interfere with the
sovereign’s fund-raising efforts abroad and perhaps (the subject of pending
litigation in New York at the moment) intercept payments made on the
borrower’s other debt obligations. It is in this ability to exert post-judgment
pressure on the sovereign borrower that the hopes of a holdout creditor for a
preferential settlement principally reside.
The first step in assessing the potential legal threat posed by
holdout creditors is to read the underlying debt instruments to see what
defenses the documents might provide to a sovereign defendant in a firefight.
The Republic of Cyprus Euro MTN documentation (June 17, 2011), for
example, offers a good illustration. Condition 7(c) of the Terms and
Conditions of the Cypriot Notes provides:
All payments are subject in all cases to any
applicable fiscal or other laws, regulations and
directives, but without prejudice to the provisions
of [the tax gross-up clause].

4

See, for example, the spectacularly ill-timed and ill-titled IMF Staff Position Note, “Default in
Today’s Advanced Economies: Unnecessary, Undesirable and Unlikely” (Sept. 1, 2010)
(available http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2010/spn1012.pdf). This paper was
released ten months before Greece, largely at the insistence of the IMF, was told to
restructure what remained of its private sector debt.
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Does this include Cypriot laws, regulations and directives?
Nota bene that the provision does not say “laws, regulations and directives in
the place of payment”.5 Read literally, therefore, it makes all payments
subject in all cases to any Cypriot laws, regulations and directives. Our
research suggests that in approximately three-quarters of the other sovereign
bonds that contain this provision, the crucial words “in the place of payment”
modify the phrase “laws, regulations and directives”.6 The absence of this
qualifying phrase in Cypriot bonds is thus both noticeable and arguably
significant.
Sticking with the Cypriot MTNs for a moment, Condition 19(e)
of the Notes states that:
“The waivers [of sovereign immunity for Republic
property] and consents [to enforcement
proceedings in foreign courts, including
enforcement against Republic assets] …do not
apply to the Republic’s title or possession of
property … necessary for the proper functioning
of the Republic as a sovereign state.”
This is a very unusual way to phrase a carveout from the
waiver of immunity for sovereign property devoted to a public purpose. It is
hard to imagine that an issuer benefiting from such a carveout would not, in a
litigation scenario, argue that all of its property held abroad was necessary
for the proper functioning of the sovereign state and therefore immune from
seizure by a disgruntled creditor.
While a close textual analysis of the sovereign’s bond
documentation may yield some potential litigation defenses, such defenses
are obviously useful only in an enforcement proceeding commenced by a
holdout creditor. The whole point of the exercise is to persuade creditors in
advance not to stay out of the restructuring and litigate. A more generally
applicable legal tool may be required for this purpose.
We believe that the Eurozone has within its power a unique
ability to deflate expectations on the part of prospective holdouts that they
will realize a higher recovery by staying out of the sovereign restructuring.
The goal of such a measure would be to affect the creditor calculus of
whether to stay out of a Eurozone sovereign debt restructuring in the first
place. Nothing can realistically be done to keep a holdout from obtaining a
judgment in a foreign court on a foreign law-governed debt instrument.
Attempting to unseat basic tenets of contract law in countries like the United
Kingdom (most foreign law-governed Eurozone sovereign bonds choose
5
6

The place of payment will typically be a foreign location such as Luxembourg or London.
This provision is typical in bonds governed by English law.
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English law) will meet fierce resistance. But the Eurozone governments
could immunize from creditor attachment the assets of a Eurozone country
(held within the Eurozone) if the country was engaged in an ESM-supported
adjustment program.
The appropriate mechanism, we believe, would be an
amendment to the 2012 Treaty Establishing the European Stability
Mechanism (“T/ESM”). Something along these lines:
ARTICLE ___
Immunity from judicial process
1. The assets and revenue streams of an
ESM Member receiving stability support
under this Treaty which are held in,
originate from, or pass through the
jurisdiction of an ESM Member shall not be
subject to any form of attachment,
garnishment, execution, injunctive relief, or
similar forms of judicial process, in
connection with a claim based on or arising
out of a debt instrument that was eligible to
participate in a restructuring of the debt of
the beneficiary ESM Member after the
effective date of this Treaty.
2. The immunities provided in the preceding
paragraph shall automatically expire when
all amounts due to the ESM from the
beneficiary ESM Member have been
repaid in full.
The objectives of such an amendment to the T/ESM would be:


to ensure that the financial support being provided by
the ESM to one of its members is not diverted to the
repayment of an existing debt obligation of that member
that was eligible to participate in a debt restructuring but
declined to do so;



to assist the beneficiary member state in any ESMapproved restructuring of its debt by deflating the
expectations of prospective holdouts that they will be
able to extract a preferential recovery through the
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pursuit of legal remedies after the restructuring closes;
and


to provide a safe harbor in the Eurozone for the
recipient state to hold its assets and conduct its
financial affairs without fear of harassment by holdout
creditors.

An amendment of the T/ESM for this purpose would become
effective within the jurisdiction of each of the Eurozone countries. The
potency of the measure would obviously be enhanced if other EU members,
particularly the United Kingdom, were to enact comparable immunities in
their domestic law. A country such as the United Kingdom might for selfish
reasons wish to incorporate such immunities into its own law; failure to do so
could drive financial transactions away from London.
The policy justification for such an amendment of the T/ESM is
self-evident and compelling. The ESM member states will be pouring
taxpayer resources into a recipient country. If a restructuring of private
sector claims is deemed essential to restore that country to a sustainable
position, the members funding that bailout should not wish to see the assets
and revenue streams of the recipient sovereign being seized by creditors
who elect not to participate in the restructuring. Every euro that is so seized
and applied toward the immediate repayment of such a claim will logically
require a corresponding one euro increase in the amount of ESM bailout
assistance. To put the matter into the geographic terms used earlier in this
paper, this would amount to a funds transfer from Stuttgart, Germany to
Greenwich, Connecticut. The ESM members have a legitimate interest in
minimizing such transfers.
The precedent
There is a precedent for just this sort of measure.
In May 2003, following the coalition invasion of Iraq to oust
Saddam Hussein, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution
1483 (May 22, 2003).7 Among other things, that Resolution encouraged the
new government in Iraq to restructure the roughly $140 billion debt stock that
Saddam had accumulated during his tenure. In the context of “the
desirability of prompt completion of the restructuring of Iraq’s debt”, the
Resolution immunized all petroleum assets of Iraq against “any form of
attachment, garnishment, or execution”, and clothed the proceeds of Iraqi oil
sales (as well as the bank account into which the proceeds of all such oil
sales were to be directed) with privileges and immunities identical to those
enjoyed by the United Nations itself.
7

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1483%282003%29
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Resolution 1483 was enacted pursuant to Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations. It was therefore binding on all members of the
organization and the Resolution instructs each member state to “take any
steps that may be necessary under their respective domestic legal systems
to assure this protection” of Iraqi oil and financial assets. These UNSCmandated immunities were periodically renewed and eventually expired on
June 30, 2011.8 In Europe, the immunities for Iraqi assets were implemented
through EU Regulation 1210/2003 (July 7, 2003) and amended from time to
time thereafter in response to UNSC Resolutions.9
It worked. In late 2004, Iraq negotiated an 80% nominal
writeoff of its debt owed to Paris Club countries and a long-term restructuring
of the balance of the claims. This translated into an 89.75 percent reduction
in the net present value of those claims. That same NPV haircut was then
offered to the holders of roughly $21 billion of Saddam-era debt owed to
private sector creditors and virtually all of those holders accepted it. The
UNSC-mandated immunization of Iraqi assets undoubtedly helped to
dampen any hope that a better recovery could be achieved at the sharp end
of a litigation.
Broader implications
An amendment of the T/ESM along the lines suggested above
would, together with the other measures already taken within the Eurozone,
substantially replicate the key features of most corporate insolvency regimes
and would cover much of the ground that the IMF’s proposed Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism sought to address in 2002. Specifically,


Supermajority creditor control of a future Eurozone sovereign debt
workout will be effected through the use of the aggregated
collective action clauses that the T/ESM mandates be included in
all Eurozone sovereign bonds issued after January 1, 2013.
Control of the workout process by a supermajority of affected
creditors, and the ability to bind any dissident creditors to the will of
that majority, is a fundamental feature of most insolvency regimes.



Supervision of the workout process will in practice be the province
of the Troika (the ECB, the IMF and the European Commission) in
much the same way as they have been doing in the bailouts of
Greece, Ireland and Portugal. This supervision implicitly covers
issues such as assessing whether a debt restructuring is required
in the debtor country, whether the terms proposed in any such
restructuring are proportional to that country’s needs, whether the
country is undertaking appropriate macroeconomic adjustment

8

See http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1956%282010%29

9

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:169:0006:0023: En:PDF
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measures, and whether the burden of the adjustment is being
shared equitably among all stakeholders (citizens, creditors and
official sector sponsors).


Although there will be no “automatic stay” preventing the initiation
of creditor lawsuits against the sovereign debtor, the amendment
to the T/ESM proposed above would effectively shield the debtor
country’s Eurozone-based assets from compulsory seizure by
holdout creditors.
*

*

*

11
[NEWYORK 2679889_1]

*

